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For every reader interested in the European law and particu-
larly in the European private law the revised book is an indispen-
sable source supporting the research and practice.
Résumé
L’article propose une analyse de l’«EuropäischeMethodenlehre»
éditée par Karl Riesenhuber. Ce livre impressionnant reflète le
processus complexe de la transformation qualitative concernant
le droit privé européen. Le patchwork des règles complétant
principalement les systèmes juridiques nationaux devient de plus
en plus un «système», mais ce système présente une nature plu-
tôt spécifique. Il exige également un développement de la métho-
dologie de l’interprétation adaptée aux besoins spécifiques de la
nature hétérogène de la législation européenne.
Le livre examiné est inspiré d’une manière caractéristique par
la pensée juridique allemande. Il a une structure «pandectiste»,
avec des parties générales et spécifiques et un chapitre consacré
aux considérations fondamentales. Avec cette approche, typique
de la tradition juridique nationale particulière, il provoque la
question de savoir si la méthodologie développée dans cet ouvra-
ge peut prétendre un caractère universel ou européen. Ces pro-
blèmes peuvent être discutés, mais un livre de cette importance
ne reflète pas seulement le système, mais elle le façonne aussi et le
crée. Il appartient à la tradition de la pensée juridique continen-
tale que la doctrine est un facteur important du renforcement du
système.
La structure «allemande» de l’ouvrage ne signifie pas que
d’autres points de vue nationaux soient abandonnés. L’inverse
est juste. Les perspectives nationales d’autres traditions juridi-
ques sont aussi profondément analysées.
Pour chaque lecteur intéressé au droit européen et en parti-
culier au droit privé européen, ce livre est une source indispen-
sable pour soutenir la recherche et la pratique.
Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsrecht
(einschl. Sonderprivatrecht der öffentlichen Hand)




The Global Financial Crisis 2007‐2009 (GFC), the most serious
financial turmoil since the Great Depression in 1929, is perceived
to have arisen from an interplay of factors, such as insufficient
national and international financial regulation, disregard of rules
and standards, insufficient supervision of individual financial in-
stitutes, the financial system as a whole and a general environ-
ment of greed and personal gain in connection with other cul-
tural, network and social factors.2
In the light of this crisis and the afore-mentioned factors, this
article will analyse the various shortcomings in corporate gover-
nance, especially the fitness and propriety of board members of
banks. It will begin (Part B) by emphasizing the fit and proper
criteria which, prior to the GFC, had already emerged from in-
ternational guidelines, directives of the European Union and
rules of its Member States, i.e. in the UK as an example. It will
then go on to analyse in Part C as to how unfitness and impro-
priety of board members of banks is perceived to have played a
contributory role in the GFC. The author will continue by crit-
ically analysing selected post-GFC reviews of “fit and proper”-
criteria (Part D) before he concludes that realistically it would
seem unlikely that the instigated reforms would effectively ad-
dress pre-GFC deficiencies.
B. Board Fitness Prior to the GFC
In the EU, the business of banking has been subject to authorisa-
tion since 1977 (credit institutions) and 1993 (investment firms)
and required inter alia two persons, who would effectively direct
the business, and who were “of sufficiently good repute” and had
“sufficient experience”.3 In April 1999, the Forum of European
1 With very special thanks to Duncan Craig LL.M. (Edinburgh), England,
for proofreading.
For this article the autor was awarded the Junior Researcher Award from
the German Society for Comparative Law (Nachwuchsförderpreis der
Gesellschaft für Rechtsvergleichung e.V.) am 12. September 2013.
2 See e.g. G Kirkpatrick, „Corporate Governance – Lessons from the Finan-
cial Crisis“ (02/2009) OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends Vol. 2009/
1, p. 63; Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the
EU chaired by Mr Jacques de Larosière (De Larosière Report) (25/02/
2009), p. 6; HM Treasury, „A Review of corporate governance in UK
banks and other financial industry entities: Final Recommendations
(Walker Review)“ (11/2009), p. 25 para 1.10.; Financial Services Authority
(FSA), „The Turner Review –A regulatory response to the global banking
crisis“ (03/2009), pp. 5, 36.
3 See Art. 3(2) of the First Council Directive 77/780/EEC of 12 December
1977 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative pro-
visions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit in-
stitutions [1977] OJ L 322, 30 and Art. 3(3) of the Council Directive 93/22/
EEC of 10May 1993 on investment services in the securities field [1993]OJ
L 141, 27 (ISD).
© sellier european law publishers 
www.sellier.de
Brought to you by | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/19/17 4:30 PM
Service –Wirtschafts- und GesellschaftsrechtGPR 6/2013322 |
Securities Commissions (FESCO) issued minimum standards4
which national authorities should apply when assessing fitness
and propriety inter alia of key individuals within investment firms
under the Investment Services Directive (ISD).5 These standards
required board members to “meet high standards of personal in-
tegrity in all respects and to be competent and capable of perform-
ing the functions or role currently performed or which it is pro-
posed they should perform in the firm”6 and to have “an appro-
priate range of skills and experience, so that, as a whole, it is able
to control and direct the business of the firm effectively”.7 Factors
to be assessed includes e.g. complete work history and relevant
experience including directorships; professional qualifications/
membership of any professional bodies; educational background
and qualifications; criminal records and civil cases (including dis-
qualification as a company director or bankruptcy), disciplinary
sanctions by regulatory authorities;8 financial integrity (personal
bankruptcy; being a member of the management or on the board
of a company that became bankrupt).9
On a national level, e.g. in the UK, the Banking Act 197910
stated in compliance with the First Banking Directive11 that
banks’ directors and managers had “to be fit and proper persons
to hold that position”. The Banking Act 1987 specified that re-
gard must be given to the individual’s probity, competence,
soundness of judgement and diligence.12 The Financial Services
andMarkets Act 2000 (FSMA),13 replacing the Banking Act 1987,
leaves it to the financial sector supervisor (i.e. the former Finan-
cial Services Authority [FSA], replaced by the Financial Conduct
Authority [FCA] and the Prudential Regulation Authority [PRA]
as per 1 April 2013)14 to set out the criteria for the assessment of
fitness and propriety. These criteria are contained in the super-
visor’s handbook “Fit and Proper test for Approved Persons”,
which stated in its first version that the most important consid-
eration will be the person’s (1) honesty, integrity and reputation;
(2) competence and capability; and (3) financial soundness.15
On a global level, it became evident in the late 1990’s that rul-
ings regarding the directorship of banks could not be left to vol-
untary codes16 alone, but should be in formal legislation and sub-
ject to authoritative supervision. As a result since 1997 several
worldwide recognised standards and guidelines, which aim to
assist governments and banking supervisors, have been issued
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)17 and
from 1999 by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD)18 and the Joint Forum.19 The pre-GFC
frameworks of these institutions contain following “Fit and
Proper”-criteria:20
(1) Personal integrity and honesty: no doubts whatsoever
should be raised either by criminal records, regulatory or judicial
judgements and sanctions in banking and other similar indus-
tries, refusal of admission to or expulsion from professional bod-
ies, previous questionable business practices, nor by the individ-
ual’s financial position.21
(2) Individual and collective expertise: i.e. to have the neces-
sary skills and knowledge and be experienced in banking and
other business.22
(3) Understanding of the board’s role, the bank’s structure
and its business and risks which require inter alia that board
members remain abreast of relevant new laws, regulations, and
changing commercial risks.23
(4) Ability to exercise objective and independent judgement
by an effective number of board members: i.e. have no close re-
lationships with the company or its management through signif-
icant economic, family or other ties and be capable of exercising
judgement independent of the views of the management, large
shareholders and governments.24
(5) To commit oneself effectively to the responsibilities of the
board, in particular to devote sufficient time and participate ac-
tively.25
C. Board Failure and the GFC
According to the OECD the “Fit and Proper”-test was often con-
fined to the assessment of fraud and history of bankruptcy prior
to the GFC.26 Critical reviews of the GFC27 have since revealed
4 The Forum of European Securities Commissions, European Standards on
Fitness and Propriety to Provide Investment Services (99-FESCO-A) (04/
1999).
5 See fn 3.
6 See fn 4, p. 7 para 21.
7 Ibid para 22.
8 Ibid p. 7 f para 24.
9 Ibid p. 8 para 25.
10 Section 7 of Schedule 2.
11 See fn 3.
12 Section 1(2) of Schedule 3.
13 Section 61(1).
14 See the Financial Services Act 2012.
15 FSA, High Level Standard FIT (Release 01/12/2001), para 1.3.1.
16 E.g. the Combined Code and its successor, the UKCorporate Governance
Code.
17 BCBS, „Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision“ (09/1997)
(BCBS Core Principles 1997); BCBS, „Enhancing Corporate Governance
for Banking Organisations“ (09/1999) (BCBS Enhancing CG 1999); BCBS,
„Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations“ (02/
2006) (BCBS Enhancing CG 2006); BCBS, „Core Principles for Effective
Banking Supervision“ (10/2006); BCBS, „Core Principles Methodology“
(10/2006) (BCBS Methodology 2006); BCBS, „Principles for Enhancing
Corporate Governance“ (10/2010) (BCBS Enhancing CG 2010); BCBS,
„Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision“ (09/2012).
18 OECD, „Principles of Corporate Governance“ (04/1999) (OECD Princi-
ples 1999); OECD, „Principles of Corporate Governance“ (2004) (OECD
Principles 2004).
19 Joint Forum BCBS, IOSCO and IAIS, „Supervision of Financial Conglo-
merates“ (02/1999) (Joint Forum Principles 1999); Joint Forum BCBS,
IOSCO and IAIS, „Principles for the supervision of financial conglome-
rates“ (09/2012) (Joint Forum Principles 2012).
20 BCBS Core Principles 1997 (fn 17); Joint Forum Principles 1999 (fn 19);
BCBS Enhancing CG 1999 (fn 17); OECD Principles 2004 (fn 18).
21 BCBS Core Principles 1997 (fn 17), p. 17; Joint Forum Principles 1999 (fn
19), p. 42 para 7.
22 BCBS Core Principles 1997 (fn 17), p. 17; OECD Principles 2004 (fn 18),
para VI/D/5; BCBS Enhancing CG 1999 (fn 17), para 19.
23 BCBS Enhancing CG 1999 (fn 17), p. 6; OECDPrinciples 2004 (fn 18), para
VI/D/1, 2, VI/E/3.
24 OECD Principles 2004 (fn 18), para VI/E; BCBS Enhancing CG 1999
(fn 17), p. 6.
25 OECD Principles 2004 (fn 18), paras V/E/2, VI/A, VI/E/3.
26 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Steering Group on Corporate Governance, „Corporate Governance and
the Financial Crisis – Key Findings and main Messages“ (06/2009)
(OECD Key Findings 2009), p. 45.
27 See e.g. Kirkpatrick (fn 2); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) Steering Group on Corporate Governance, „Cor-
porate Governance and the Financial Crisis. Conclusions and emerging
good practices to enhance implementation of the Principles“ (02/2010)
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additional weaknesses of banks’ boards, deficiencies which go
beyond the financial soundness of its members.
I. Lack of Understanding
Since the 1990s the financial system has become increasingly
complicated. Banks have become much larger and their struc-
tures, businesses and products more complex and opaque.28
Boundaries have become obfuscated through technology shar-
ing, out-sourcing and complex interconnections with the “shad-
ow-banking” sector.29 Incomprehension of impending dangers
at board level and informational asymmetries arising from weak
oversight of the management body have subsequently led to a
failure to identify and thus constrain excessive risk-taking.30
II. Lack of Commitment
This increased complexity would have required board members
to engage themselves more effectively. Especially the part-time
non-executive directors (NEDs) were obviously not sufficiently
involved, had not invested the time required nor had they par-
ticipated actively enough in the processes to recognise the warn-
ing signs. Their focus concentrated rather on ticking boxes in-
stead of seriously challenging the management.31
III. Lack of Competence
Furthermore many boards were lacking in solid expertise and
sound competences, especially technical skills to understand
products, control balance sheet growth and the liquidity needs
in order to manage risks.32 The inability and lack of willingness
of many directors to adequately identify, understand, control
and constrain the risks are considered by the European Commis-
sion to be at the heart of the origins of the crisis.33
Additionally, the lack of non-technical abilities (e.g. sufficient
communication skills) and confidence made many NEDs deem
themselves unable to ask questions and raise objections, when
faced with a strong CEO.34
IV. Lack of Experience
Prior to the GFC the independence of NEDs in particular seemed
to out-rank their expertise.35 Post crisis it has been conceded that
the degree of experience was indeed insufficient.36 It was neither
sufficiently deep to establish a risk strategy and controlling risks,
nor broad and diverse enough in views to effectively challenge
the management.37
V. Lack of Independence
The European Commission asserts that many NEDs were not in
a position to form objective and independent judgements.38 The
Treasury Committee of the House of Commons even laments
that “too often NEDs in the banking sector operated as members
of a ‘cosy club’ rather than viewing their role as being that of
providing effective checks and balances on executive members
of boards.”39 Although some argue that the whirl of board mem-
berships, i.e. cross directorships, could cause conflicts of interest
with prevailing self-interests,40 others point out that companies
with more independent boards experienced worse stock re-
turns.41
VI. Intellectual Hazard
Intellectual hazard describes the problem which arises when de-
cision-makers in complex organisations ignore key information
pertinent to a decision because of limited ability, time con-
straints, pre-formed ideas, or self-interests.42 It might amount
in “groupthink”, where group members try to reach consensus
without critically testing, analysing and evaluating ideas, or
“herding”, which refers to the imitation of actions of others while
ignoring their own information and judgment.43
(OECD Conclusions 2010); De Larosière Report (fn 2); Commission,
„Green Paper – Corporate governance in financial institutions and remu-
neration policies {COM(2010) 285 final} {COM(2010) 286 final} {SEC
(2010) 669}“ COM(2010) 284 final (Commission Green Paper CG 2010);
Commission, „Commission staff working document – Corporate Gover-
nance in Financial Institutions: Lessons to be drawn from the current
financial crisis, best practices Accompanying document to the Green Pa-
per Corporate governance in financial institutions and remuneration po-
licies {COM(2010) 284 final}“ SEC(2010) 669 (Commission Accompany-
ing document to the Green Paper CG 2010); Turner Review (fn 2); Walker
Review (fn 2); House of Commons Treasury Committee, Ninth Report of
Session 2008‐09 „Banking Crisis: Reforming corporate governance and
pay in the City“ (15/05/2009) (House of Commons, Ninth Report).
28 See e.g. FSA, „The failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland“ (12/2011), p. 50
para 20, p. 153 para 313, p. 220 para 571.
29 Ibid p. 39 para 4.6; OECD Conclusions 2010 (fn 27), para 60.
30 See e.g. EBA Guidelines on Internal Governance (GL 44) (27/09/2011)
(EBA Guidelines 2011), p. 8 para 20; De Larosière Report (fn 2), p. 10 para
23.
31 Commission Green Paper CG 2010 (fn 27), p. 6; Walker Review (fn 2),
p. 53 para 4.3; House of Commons Ninth Report (fn 27), p. 53 para 146.
32 A Arora, „The corporate governance failings in financial institutions and
directors’ legal liability“ (2011) Co Law 32(1) (Arora, Failings), p. 5.
33 Commission Green Paper CG 2010 (fn 27), p. 6.
34 Ibid.
35 See e.g. Kirkpatrick (fn 2), p. 81.
36 See e.g. Commission, „Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament
and the Council on markets in financial instruments repealing Directive
2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (Recast)“COM
(2011) 656 final – 2011/0298 (COD) (MiFID II Proposal), p. 118.
37 Commission Accompanying document to the Green Paper CG 2010 (fn
27), p. 8; Arora, Failings (fn 32), p. 6.
38 Commission ibid, p. 8; Arora ibid, p. 6.
39 House of Commons Ninth Report (fn 27), p. 55 para 151.
40 A Arora, „Remuneration practices in banks and other financial instituti-
ons: Part 1“ (2012) Co Law 33(3), p. 71.
41 D H Erkens, M Hung and P Matos, „Corporate Governance in the 2007‐
2008 Financial Crisis: Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide“
(04/2012) Journal of Corporate Finance 18(2), p. 407.
42 G PMiller and GRosenfeld, „Intellectual Hazard: HowConceptual Biases
in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008“ (2010)Har-
vard Journal of Law & Public Policy 33(2) (Miller and Rosenfeld), pp. 810,
813, 815, 817.
43 S Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice
(2008), p. 95.
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The problem of intellectual hazard is that it erodes the quality
of decision making, which might be exacerbated in a crisis when
there is an information overload and little time for thought, and
when there are less sufficiently diverse backgrounds represented
on a board in terms of gender, social, cultural and educational
background.44
Some reviews of theGFCconcluded thatmanyboards tended to
rely upon mathematical models, rating agencies and followed the
crowd instead of applying critical and independent thinking.45
D. „Fit and Proper“-Criteria in Review
The inability of directors and the failure of boards themselves to
fulfil their duties have led to a series of law reforms including the
review of “Fit and Proper”-criteria.
In 2011 in the European Union for instance, the Commission
suggested recasting the existing “fit and proper”-criteria con-
tained in the Banking Directive46 (credit institutions) and in Mi-
FID47 (investment firms). The Commission’s two proposals, the
CRD IV Proposal48 and the MiFID II Proposal49 contain inter alia
revised “Fit and Proper”-provisions,50 as the former rules were
seen to have been too generic and have led to a different applica-
tion in Member States.51 The general approach is to foster boards
with directors who are independent, committed, informed and
diverse.52 Such criteria should be applied to both executive direc-
tors and NEDs.53 While the legislative procedures of MiFID II are
on-going, the CRD IV reform was completed in late June 2013.
The “Fit and Proper”-criteria for the management body of credit
institutions are now set out in Art. 91 of the CRD IVDirective.54
Also in 2011, but still on the basis of the Banking Directive,
the European Banking Authority (EBA) issued guidelines,55
which deal inter alia with the composition, appointment and
the qualifications of the management body including conflicts
of interest and time commitment. Additionally, in 2012, the
EBA published guidelines for the assessment of the suitability
of members of the management body and key function holders
of credit institutions.56 These aim to be consistent with the CRD
IV Proposal and are to be complied with as from 22 May 2013.57
Nonetheless the CRD IV Directive is requiring revised guidelines
by 31 December 2015.58 With respect to the authorisation of in-
vestment firms, to which the CRD IV Directive does not apply,59
similar guidelines are expected from the European Securities and
Markets Authority (ESMA).60 It remains questionable as to
whether the ESMA will issue such guidelines before the Euro-
pean legislator has completed the MiFID II reform.
I. Good Repute
The CRD IV Directive61 and MiFID II62 Proposal continue to re-
quire directors to be of good repute and act with integrity and
honesty. According to Art. 13 EBA Guidelines 2012, the assess-
ment of good repute should take into account unlawful behav-
iour (criminal or civil/administrative convictions), current in-
vestigations and even non-transparent and uncooperative be-
haviour when dealing with supervisory authorities and even re-
fused registration or memberships. However, there is no mini-
mum level of good standing stated in order to obtain authorisa-
tion.
II. Competence
Directorship of a bank demands competence. This derives from
the MiFID II Proposal and the CRD IV Directive which require
directors to have sufficient knowledge, skills and experience, in-
dividually “to perform their duties”,63 but also collectively “to be
able to understand the institution’s activities and main risks” in-
volved in those activities.64 There is no further explanation in the
Directive as to how the terms “knowledge”, “skills”, “expertise”
should be defined nor as to how these requirements should be
44 Miller and Rosenfeld (fn 42), pp. 819 f.; Commission Accompanying do-
cument to the Green Paper CG 2010 (fn 27), p. 3.
45 R Tomasic, „The failure of corporate governance and the limits of law:
British banks and the global financial crisis“: Ch 3 in Corporate Gover-
nance and the Global Financial Crisis. International Perspectives (2011)
(W Sun, J Stewart and D Pollard, eds.), p. 54; R Grosse, „Bank regulation,
governance and the crisis: a behavioral finance view“ (2012) Journal of
Economic Perspectives 20(1), p. 15.
46 Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit
institutions (recast) [2006] OJ L 177, 1.
47 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Di-
rectives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/
22/EEC [2004] OJ L 145, 1.
48 Commission, „Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
the Council on the access to the activity of credit institutions and the
prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms and
amending Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insuran-
ce undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate“ COM
(2011) 453 final – 2011/0203 (COD) (CRD IV Proposal).
49 MiFID II Proposal (fn 36).
50 Art. 87 CRD IV Proposal (fn 48); Art. 9 MiFID II Proposal (fn 36).
51 Commission, „Commission Staff Working Paper Executive Summary of
the Impact Assessment“ SEC(2011) 1226 final (MiFID II Impact Assess-
ment), pp. 266 f.
52 See M Conyon, WQ Judge and M Useem, „Corporate Governance and
the 2008‐09 Financial Crisis“ (2011) Corporate Governance: An Interna-
tional Review 19(5) (Conyon et al.), p. 401.
53 MiFID II Proposal (fn 36), p. 118 para 12.6.1 and p. 267 para 19.6(a).
54 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the pru-
dential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending
Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/
EC [2013] OJ L 176, 338 (CRD IV Directive).
55 EBA Guidelines 2011 (fn 30).
56 EBA Guidelines on the assessment of the suitability of members of the
management body and key function holders (EBS/GL/2012/06), (22/11/
2012) (EBA Guidelines 2012).
57 Ibid, pp. 4, 18, 33.
58 See Art. 91(12) CRD IV Directive (fn 54).
59 Ibid Art. 2(5)(1).
60 EBA, „Consultation Paper on draft Guidelines for assessing the suitability
of members of the management body and key function holders of a credit
institution (EBA/CP/2013/03)“ (18/04/2012) (EBA Consultation Paper),
p. 7 para 10.
61 Art. 91(1) and (8).
62 Art. 9(1)(c).
63 Art. 9(1) MiFID II Proposal (fn 36); Art. 91(1) CRD IV Directive (fn 54).
64 Art. 9(1)(b) MiFID II Proposal (fn 36); Art. 91(7) CRD IV Directive (fn
54).
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distinguished. Of little assistance in this respect is the German
version of the Directive with the words “Kenntnisse”, “Fähigkeit-
en”, “Erfahrung”, nor the French version with “connaissances”,
“compétences”, “experience”.
Other critical reviews require competences relevant to each of
the material financial activities the bank intends to pursue (e.g.
finance, accounting, lending, etc.),65 competences in managing
teams of employees, assessing the effectiveness of a credit insti-
tution’s arrangements and identifying key issues based on finan-
cial information66 or even “commonsense”67 and the ability to
“combine financial competence with leadership skills”.68
The decision as to whether a specific person is competent
enough to attain authorisation depends upon several factors:
A first factor concerns the level and profile of education and
also the nature and scope of competencies, decision making
powers and responsibilities in previous jobs.69
Secondly, the scale and complexity of the bank’s business and
the applicant’s role in the bank’s corporate governance.70 This
would mean that the supervisory authority has to assess not only
the individual director but also the responsibility structures and
accountability lines including subsidiaries, affiliated entities and
other related entities.71
Thirdly, the other directors. A board member is expected to
complement the competencies of the existing board and be of
“additional value”.72
This implicates that an individual considered fit for director-
ship within one bank may not be considered fit in another insti-
tution and conversely.73 The question remains as to exactly
which criteria a board member has to meet to be competent
enough and as to what extent board members can compensate
for a lower level of competence with genius counterparts on the
same board or external experts. These are at the same time clas-
sical issues of company law, especially the duty of skill, care and
diligence.74
III. Understanding
A third “Fit and Proper”-criterion concerns “understanding”,
which refers to the following key areas: structure, business and
individual role.
Firstly, board members should fully understand the bank’s
operational structure, including where the bank operates in ju-
risdictions or through structures that impede transparency
(“know your structure”).75 This understanding should encom-
pass the group structure, including the purposes of entities, links
and relationships among them, limitations, the aims of all units,
all mutual relationships and refers to all risks (legally and opera-
tional) of intra group transactions under any circumstances.76 It
is expected that understanding should extend to the evolution of
the structures,77 even to include the last 40 years.78
Secondly, directors should understand all the types of activi-
ties the bank intends to pursue (“know your business”) including
the associated risks, the financial industry in general, the posi-
tion of the bank including its aspirations for the future, and eco-
nomics (especially markets).79
Finally, board members are expected to have a clear under-
standing of their role in the corporate governance of the bank
(“know your role”).80
The CRD IV Directive and the MiFID II Proposal are some-
what reluctant concerning this criterion only requiring directors
to collectively “understand the institution’s activities and the
main risks”.81
IV. Board Diversity
It is often argued that the chemistry among board members
plays an important role in its effectiveness.82 This is why the
Commission not only provides for acquirable criteria (education
and professional background), but also diversity with regards to
gender, age, education, profession and provenance.83 At the first
reading of MiFID II and CRD IV by the European Parliament,
the draft resolution even contained a gender quota of one
third.84
It seems uncontroversial that diversity can help to alleviate
individual dominance and intellectual hazard,85 and facilitate
critical challenge by contributing to openness towards different
ideas, ways of thinking, and points of view.86 Gender diversity in
particular is seen to lead to a more balanced board.87 Some com-
65 BCBS Enhancing CG 2010 (fn 17), p. 10 para 36.
66 EBA Consultation Paper (fn 60), Art. 14(6).
67 Walker Review (fn 2), p. 96 para 6.17.
68 Commission Accompanying document to the Green Paper CG 2010 (fn
27), p. 11.
69 EBA Guidelines 2012 (fn 56), p. 12 paras 5.1, 5.2, p. 13 para 7.1, p. 17 paras
14.2, 14.5.
70 MiFID II Proposal (fn 36), p. 267.
71 Commission Green Paper CG 2010 (fn 27), p. 11.
72 OECD Principles 2004 (fn 18), para VI.5; OECDWebsite http://www.oecd.
org/document/49/0,3746,en_2649_34813_43063537_1_1_1_1,00.html
(accessed 25/10/2013).
73 Joint Forum Principles 1999 (fn 19), p. 43 para 13.
74 See regarding external legal experts e.g. the German „Ision“-Case, BGH
decision from 20/09/2011 (Az.: II ZR 233/09).
75 BCBS Enhancing CG 2006 (fn 17), p. 17 para 56.
76 BCBS Enhancing CG 2010 (fn 17), pp. 26‐27 paras 115, 117, p. 3 para 6(5);
EBA Guidelines 2011 (fn 30), p. 18 para 16.1, p. 19 paras 6.3, 7.1.
77 Ibid p. 3 para 6.5.
78 Group of Thirty, „Toward Effective Governance of Financial Institutions“
(04/2012) (G30), p. 37.
79 See BCBS Enhancing CG 2006 (fn 17), para 36; BCBS Methodology 2006
(fn 17), para 13; EBA Guidelines 2011 (fn 30), paras 13.3, 13.4; EBA Gui-
delines 2012 (fn 56), para 14.6; G30 (fn 77), p. 36.
80 BCBS Enhancing CG 2010 (fn 17), p. 10 Principle 2; OECD Conclusions
2010 (fn 27), para 62.
81 Art. 9(1)(b) MiFID II Proposal (fn 36); Art. 91(7) CRD IV Directive (fn
54).
82 See e.g. G30 (fn 77), p. 36.
83 Art. 9(3) MiFID II Proposal (fn 36); Art. 87(3) CRD IV Proposal (fn 48).
84 See European Parliament, Report of First Reading on the CRD IV Pro-
posal (fn 48), A7‐0170/2012 (30/05/2012), Art. 87(3); and European Par-
liament, Report of First Reading on the MiFID II Proposal (fn 36), A7‐
0306/2012 (05/10/2012), Art. 9(3).
85 See above C/VI. Recital 60 of the CRD IVDirective (fn 54) explicitly men-
tions „groupthink“.
86 G30 (fn 77), p. 35; Commission Accompanying document to the Green
Paper CG 2010 (fn 27), p. 8; recital 38 of the MiFID II Proposal (fn 36);
recital 60 of the CRD IV Directive (fn 54).
87 See e.g. Commission Accompanying document to the Green Paper CG
2010 (fn 27), p. 11.
© sellier european law publishers 
www.sellier.de
Brought to you by | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/19/17 4:30 PM
Service –Wirtschafts- und GesellschaftsrechtGPR 6/2013326 |
panies can allegedly provide evidence that boards and top level
management with a strong female representation perform better
than those without.88 It is however highly questionable as to
whether diversity should be elevated from a “best practice rule”
to an authorisation criterion. In the end the CRD IV Directive
did not provide for a gender quota.89 It leaves it to the Member
States to require credit institutions to have a policy promoting
diversity with “a broad set of qualities and competence” in the
management body.90
V. Independence
It is uncontroversial that at least some NEDs should be capable
of objective and independent judgement.91 However, the mean-
ing of “independence” varies across different legal systems and
even within a jurisdiction.92
Independence can be seen as the ability to exercise objective,
independent judgement after fair consideration of all relevant
information and views without undue influence from other cir-
cumstances or interests that would impair the judgement.93 Un-
due influence might emerge from facts or simply from a state of
mind.
Firstly, undue influence from facts can result from personal or
financial ties (including business) in relation to other directors,
management, dominant shareholders or the company itself.
While some ties aremoreobvious (e.g. close familymembers) oth-
ers are less evident and controversial (e.g. cross directorships94).
Secondly, undue influence from a state of mind might be very
subtle and difficult to prove. Some argue that the mere length of
time served on the board or under the same CEO/Chairman
might impede independence and so provide for time limits on
board memberships.95 Objectivity might also be impaired if a di-
rector is unable to resist pressure96 or to voice independent or
potentially unpopular views.97
As opposed to the independence of mind, which is required
from all directors,98 financial independence might only concern
NEDs, as executive directors with a fulltime contract can, by def-
inition, not be independent of financial ties.99 However, the CRD
IV Directive and MiFID II Proposal only provide for independ-
ence of mind.100
VI. Commitment
Various review-findings that NEDs tend to participate insuffi-
ciently have led to proposals as to how they could devote more
time and participate more actively on boards.
1. Time Commitment
(1) To limit the number of directorships: The CRD IV Direc-
tive and the MiFID II Proposal provide for a fixed number of
boards on which a director may sit (subject to exceptions).101
Additionally the EBA also provides for limited additional profes-
sional activities.102 Critically speaking limiting directorships and
other professional activities is ineffective, as any board member
who spends time on other activities (e.g. private, political or
charitable) could be prevent from giving the necessary time to
their role as a director.103
(2) To require a minimum amount of working days: This ap-
proach is already known from best practice rules.104 The EBA
also states that the time commitment should be stipulated in a
written document, such as the letter of appointment. The indi-
vidual director should confirm that he or she can devote the re-
quired amount of time to the role, alongside their other commit-
ments.105
(3) Full time NEDs: To cope with the increased complexity
and duties the appointment of full time NEDs for banks has been
suggested,106 despite contradicting the principle of independ-
ence.107
2. Active Participation
A director’s duty is no longer limited to merely voting at board
meetings.108 He is expected to actively participate, which means
inter alia (1) gathering information from the management and
other source to allow decision-making on a fully informed ba-
sis;109 (2) preparing for board meetings, e.g. reviewing board and
committee papers before each meeting;110 (3) spending time with
88 E M Davies, Women on boards (2011), pp. 3, 8.
89 A gender quota remains an issue for boards of companies listed on the
stock exchange. See Commission, „Proposal for a Directive of the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council on improving the gender balance
among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges
and related measures“ COM(2012) 614 final – 2012/0299 (COD).
90 See Art. 91(10) CRD IV Directive (fn 54).
91 OECD Principles 1999 (fn 18), p. 24 para V.E; BCBS Enhancing CG 2006
(fn 17), p. 7; Commission Accompanying document to the Green Paper
CG 2010 (fn 27), p. 10 para 2.2.2.
92 BCBS Enhancing CG 2006 (fn 17), p. 7 fn 12; D Higgs, Review of the Role
and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors (2003) http://www.bis.gov.
uk/files/file23012.pdf (accessed 26/10/2013), p. 36 para 9.8. See also: Com-
mission, „EC: Commission Recommendation of 15 February 2005 on the
role of non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and on
the committees of the (supervisory) board“ [2005] OJ L 52, 51, para 13.1.
93 Joint Forum Principles 2012 (fn 19), p. 22 para 14.4.
94 OECD Conclusions 2010 (fn 27), para 58.
95 See e.g. OECD Conclusions 2010 (fn 27), para 44 box 3, para 57.
96 Higgs (fn 91), p. 115.
97 H Mehran, AMorrison and J Shapiro, „Corporate Governance and
Banks: What HaveWe Learned from the Financial Crisis?“ (2011) Federal
Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports no. 502 (Mehran et al.) http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1880009 (accessed 26/10/2013), p. 11.
98 See e.g. Art. 91(8) CRD IV Directive (fn 54); Art. 9(1)(c) MiFID II Pro-
posal (fn 36).
99 Higgs (fn 91), p. 35 paras 9.1 f.
100 See fn 97.
101 Art. 91(3)-(6) CRD IVDirective (fn 54); Art. 9(1)(a)MiFID II Proposal (fn
36).
102 EBA Guidelines 2011 (fn 30), p. 24 para 12.3.
103 See also FSA, „Response to Commission Green Paper: Corporate Gover-
nance in Financial Institutions and Remuneration Policies“ (31/08/2010),
p. 3 para 1.1.
104 See e.g. B.3.2 of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2012.
105 EBA Guidelines 2011 (fn 30), p. 24 para 12.4.
106 See e.g. Walker Review (fn 2), p. 49 para 3.23; OECD Key Findings 2009
(fn 26), p. 42.
107 OECD Conclusions 2010 (fn 27), para 59.
108 BCBS Enhancing CG 2010 (fn 10), p. 8 para 24; EBA Guidelines 2011 (fn
30), p. 24 para 12.1.
109 Mehran et al. (fn 96), p. 12; OECD Principles 2004 (fn 18), p. 59 para VI.A.
110 Walker Review (fn 2), p. 48 para 3.19.
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executives within the bank to obtain insight and understanding
of how the organisation works;111 (4) being present and voting at
board meetings112 and exercising the powers to vote;113 (5) ac-
tively challenging and testing proposals put forward by the exec-
utive and satisfying themselves that the decision making is based
on accurate information;114 (6) behaving collaboratively on the
board and engaging effectively in teamwork.115
Although Walker rightly points out that the “focus should be
on the overall output of the board rather than time input”,116 the
critical question remains as to how to decide from a supervisory
point of view, whether a specific person will be able to commit
him/herself sufficiently enough to obtain authorisation.
Summary
Decades before the outbreak of the GFC international and na-
tional legal frameworks made directorship of banks subject to a
suitability assessment. Despite this ruling unfitness and impro-
priety contributed substantially to the GFC, because the provi-
sions had neither been sufficiently clear, nor implemented in na-
tional legislation nor effectively enforced.117
This paper has sought to analyse some of the proposed and
revised rules and concludes that the reforms are unlikely to mit-
igate the problem of varying national standards and ineffective
enforcement. For the following two reasons it would seem that
despite the law reforms more lenient approaches are still being
widely allowed in order to attract business in local markets and
enforcement would not be more effective.118
Firstly the criteria are still too generic. Examples are the Com-
mission’s proposal to refuse authorisation to investment firms “if
there are objective and demonstrable grounds for believing that
the management body of the firm may pose a threat to the sound
management, clients’ interests and the integrity of the market”119
and the licensing criteria of “knowledge”, “skills” and “experi-
ence” in the CRD IV Directive.120 In contrast to best practices,121
supervisory laws should state minimum requirements for au-
thorisation. A conclusive list of clear requirements would surely
seem more expedient.
Secondly, rulebooks rarely state clear thresholds in order to
attain authorisation. Criteria would seem to be assessed on non-
transparent sliding scales. The following questions could serve as
examples.
(1) What level of independence of mind is expected from a
highly competent and committed director?
(2) To what extent can the contents of the criminal/adminis-
trative record of a highly qualified director with a sound under-
standing of financial markets be taken into account?
(3) To what extent can the cultural background of a director
be taken into consideration when assessing his competencies?
(4) To what extent should the size and complexity of financial
institutions be taken into account?
Unclear criteria will force supervisory authorities to continu-
ously assess a wide range of information, requiring very high ex-
pertise and a sound understanding of the institutes – inevitably
leading to high costs and resulting in arbitrary decisions.
This analysis criticises that instead of leading to clarity the
main thread of the recent law reforms will rather shift the assess-
ment of the correct functioning of boards and the decision-mak-
ing in terms of its composition from the bank to supervisory au-
thorities. Legislators and standard-setting bodies would be ad-
vised to bear in mind the distinction between supervisory law
and company law (incl. best practices). The primary responsibil-
ity for ensuring that regulated entities are prudently and soundly
managed and directed lies with the regulated entities them-
selves.122 It is simply not possible to regulate for board compe-
tence and objectivity.123 Authorisation procedures can neither
prevent nor prohibit failings of banks, even if they are considered
to be too big to fail.
Zusammenfassung
Bereits vor Ausbruch der globalen Finanzkrise im Jahr 2007 sti-
pulierten internationale Standards (bspw. der OECD und des
Basler Ausschusses für Bankenaufsicht), EU-Richtlinien und na-
tionales Recht der Mitgliedstaaten persönliche Anforderungskri-
terien für Mitglieder des Leitungsorgans von Kreditinstituten
und Wertpapierfirmen (sog. „fit and proper test“). Nichtsdesto-
trotz wurden im Rahmen der Aufarbeitung der Finanzkrise In-
kompetenz und Unzuverlässigkeit vonMitgliedern der Leitungs-
organe als wesentliche Krisenfaktoren identifiziert. Dieser Bei-
trag beleuchtet die Kriterien für „fitness“ und „propriety“, ins-
besondere mit Blick auf die aktuellsten Reformprojekte der EU
namentlich CRD IV und MiFID II. Der Autor kommt zum
Schluss, dass die „Fit and Proper“-Kriterien weiterhin zu gene-
rell, unbestimmt und unklar sind, um den Reformanliegen ge-
bührend Rechnung zu tragen.
Résumé*
Déjà avant l’éclatement de la crise financière mondiale en 2007
(?), des critères d’exigence personnels pour des membres des
organes directeurs des établissements de crédit et des entreprises
d’investissement (nommée «fit and proper test») étaient stipulés
par des standards internationaux (p. ex. de l’OCDE et du Comité
de Bâle sur le contrôle bancaire), par des Directives de l’UE et par
111 Ibid p. 48 para 3.19.
112 Commission Accompanying Document to the Green Paper CG 2010 (fn
27), p. 10; Walker Review (fn 2), Recommendation 22, p. 147.
113 Walker Review (fn 2), Recommendation 22.
114 Ibid Recommendation 6.
115 G30 (fn 77), pp. 30, 32.
116 Walker Review (fn 2), p. 48 para 3.22.
117 See e.g. OECD Key Findings 2009 (fn 26), p. 55; OECD Conclusions 2010
(fn 27), para 13; Commission Green Paper CG 2010 (fn 27), p. 18 para 5.8;
EBA Guidelines 2011 (fn 30), p. 7; Arora, Failings (fn 32), p. 13; Conyon et
al. (fn 52), p. 403.
118 A Enria, Speech „Banking supervision: towards an EU Single Rulebook“
(05/12/2011) http://www.eba.europa.eu/-/the-chairperson-of-the-europe
an-banking-authority-spoke-at-the-belgian-financial-forum (accessed
26/10/2013), pp. 8 f.
119 Art. 9(7) MiFID II Proposal (fn 36).
120 Art. 91(1) CRD IV Directive (fn 54).
121 E.g. UK Corporate Governance Code.
122 Joint Forum Principles 1999 (fn 19), p. 41 para 3.
123 OECD Key Findings 2009 (fn 26), p. 46.
* Übersetzt von Malte Kramme.
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le droit national des États membres. Néanmoins, au cours de
l’évaluation des causes de la crise financière, l’incompétence et
un manque de l’honoribilité des membres des organes directeurs
ont été identifié comme causes principales de la crise financière.
Cet article discute les effets des critères «fitness» et «propriety»,
et leur emploi dans les derniers projets de réforme de l’UE,
notamment CRD IV et MiFID II.
L’auteur arrive à la conclusion que les critères «fitness» et
«propriety» restent trop générales, indéfinis et vagues pour con-
tribuer aux objectifs de la réforme.
Finanzmarktregulierung in der Krise oder die Krise der Finanzmarktregulierung?*
Kritische Anmerkungen zur Übertragung der Banken- und Finanzaufsicht auf die EZB
Mona Philomena Ladler, Graz
1. Einleitung
Im Rahmen der Reaktion auf die Finanzkrise wurden der EZB
Aufgaben in der Banken-1 und Finanzaufsicht2 übertragen.
Parallel zu ihrem traditionellen Mandat, der Durchführung der
Geldpolitik,3 ist sie nunmehr für die Sicherstellung von Finanz-
stabilität verantwortlich und agiert künftig als zentrale Auf-
sichtsbehörde über den europäischen Bankensektor. Im Gegen-
satz zur Entwicklung der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion
(WWU), deren Wurzeln auf den 1970 veröffentlichten Werner-
Bericht zurückdatieren,4 nahm die Reform lediglich vier Jahre in
Anspruch. Die Raschheit, mit der die Kompetenzen der EZB
erweitert wurden, impliziert die Fragestellung nach der Nach-
haltigkeit der Reform. Wie umfassend sind die Befugnisse der
EZB tatsächlich? Ist dieser Schritt förderlich für die Finanz-
marktintegration in der EU oder unterstützt er vielmehr die
Entwicklung eines Kerneuropa, bestehend aus den Mitglied-
staaten der WWU?
Dieser Beitrag thematisiert Herausforderungen, die sich aus
der Betrauung der EZB mit Aufgaben der Banken- und Finanz-
aufsicht ergeben und sohin die Doppeldeutigkeit des Begriffsver-
ständnisses von „Finanzmarktregulierung in der Krise“. Ist diese
als eine noch unvollendete Baustelle, die Europa auf neue Funda-
mente stützt und Stabilität bewirkt, zu qualifizieren? Oder „brö-
ckelt“ vielmehr das Fundament und riskieren zu rasche Aufbau-
und Umbauarbeiten Instabilität und eine Kluft in den Mauern?
Finanzmarktregulierung in der Krise kann einem Janus gleich
als Reaktion auf die gegenwärtige Krise ergehen oder aber sich
selbst in einer Krise befinden. Anhand des Beispiels der EZB soll
in diesem Beitrag der Unterschied zwischen den beiden Ausle-
gungsmöglichkeiten dargestellt und der schmale Grat zwischen
nachhaltiger und überstürzter Regulierung, auf dem die EU wan-
delt, zur Diskussion gestelllt werden. Zu diesem Zweck werden im
nächsten Abschnitt die neuen Tätigkeitsfelder der EZB dargestellt
und mögliche Problembereiche aufgeworfen. Im Anschluss wird
hinterfragt, ob sich die Finanzmarktregulierung diesbezüglich
von einer Finanzmarktregulierung als Reaktion auf die Krise hin
zu einer Krise der Finanzmarktregulierung gewandelt hat. In ei-
nem weiteren Schritt wird diskutiert, ob dies spiegelbildlich für
die gesamte Reform des EU-Finanzsektors ist.
2. Aufsichtsrechtliche Aufgaben der EZB
2.1. Finanzaufsicht
Die EZB ist auf mehreren Ebenen in den Europäischen Aus-
schuss für Systemrisiken (European Systemic Risk Board –
ESRB) eingebunden. Dieser ist als unabhängiges Gremium ohne
Rechtspersönlichkeit5 mit Sitz in Frankfurt am Main6 eingerich-
tet und hat seine Tätigkeit am 1.1.2011 aufgenommen. Dem
ESRB obliegt die Makroaufsicht über das EU-Finanzsystem, wel-
ches alle Finanzinstitute, -märkte, -produkte und Marktinfra-
strukturen erfasst.7 Er ist der Sicherstellung der Finanzstabilität8
innerhalb der EU verpflichtet und fördert das reibungslose
Funktionieren des Binnenmarktes.9 Zu diesem Zweck erhebt er
alle notwendigen Informationen, anhand derer potenzielle Sys-
* Dieser Beitrag wurde am 12.9.2013 mit dem Nachwuchsförderpreis der Ge-
sellschaft für Rechtsvergleichung e.V. ausgezeichnet.
1 VO (EU) 1024/2013 des Rates v. 15.10.2013 zur Übertragung besonderer
Aufgaben im Zusammenhang mit der Aufsicht über Kreditinstitute auf
die Europäische Zentralbank, ABl. L 2013/287, 63 („SSM-VO“).
2 VO (EU) 1092/2010 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates v.
24.11.2010 über die Finanzaufsicht der Europäischen Union auf Makro-
ebene und zur Errichtung eines Europäischen Ausschusses für System-
risiken, ABl. L 2010/331, 1 („ESRB-VO“), VO (EU) 1096/2010 des Rates v.
17.12.2010 zur Betrauung der Europäischen Zentralbank mit besonderen
Aufgaben bezüglich der Arbeitsweise des Europäischen Ausschusses für
Systemrisiken, ABl. L 2010/331, 162.
3 Siehe Kapitel IV des Protokolls Nr. 4 über die Satzung des Europäischen
Systems der Zentralbanken und der Europäischen Zentralbank, ABl. C
2010/83, 201 („EZB-Satzung“).
4 Bericht an Rat undKommission v 8.10.1970 über die stufenweise Verwirk-
lichung der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion in der Gemeinschaft, ABl.
C 1970/136, 1, 9 („Werner-Bericht“); weitergeführt durch Europäische
Kommission, Bericht zur Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion in der Euro-
päischen Gemeinschaft, 1988, ABl. C 1989/329, 44 („Delors-Bericht“).
5 Erwägungsgrund 15 ESRB-VO. Die mangelnde Rechtspersönlichkeit
führt dazu, dass das ESRB nicht rechtsverbindlich handeln kann. Analog
zuMayer,Die gegenwärtige und künftige Rolle der Europäischen Zentral-
bank bei der Verhütung und Bewältigung von Finanzkrisen, ZBB 2011, 25
(25), der ausführt, dass nur eine mit Rechtspersönlichkeit ausgestattete
EZB rechtsverbindlich handeln könne.
6 Art. 1 Abs. 1 S 2 ESRB-VO.
7 Art. 2 lit b ESRB-VO.
8 Diese wird als das übergeordnete Ziel des ESRB betrachtet: Lehmann/
Manger-Nestler,Das neue Europäische Finanzaufsichtssystem, ZBB 2011,
2 (21).
9 Art. 3 Abs. 1 ESRB-VO.
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